As I write these lines sitting on the train from Paris to Rome the Wall Street Journal Europe Edition is criticizing the latest EU regulation aimed assuaging what Brussels bureaucrats fear is a rising tide of anger by the fifteen millions plus Muslim citizens and residents of the European Union at their host countries and the larger European-Western culture they comprise. From now on, official EU documents will not refer directly to jihad or similar terms, but instead describe such phenomena as merely “an abusive interpretation of Islam” in order to “take away any possible motivation” for terrorism” (WSJ Europe, May 5-7, 2006, p. W10). President Bush would certainly not go that far to tackle the hostility towards the United States across much of the Muslim world; but he also recognizes America's “image problem,” to which he responded by making sure to remind people that Islam is a “religion of peace,” while creating an “Office of Public Diplomacy” and, at least in Iraq, paying to place propaganda in local newspapers in an effort to shift the public mood towards a more favorable view of US policy goals and effects.
It is easy to dismiss such actions on the part of Western leaders as naïve or even duplicitous, but the reality is that they reflect the dominant sentiment that among the most crucial components of the war against “Islamist terror” is changing the opinion of Muslims, both in the Muslim majority world and living in the West, of the United States and Europe. There are, of course, very good reasons for Western politicians to want to change the views of hundreds of millions of Muslims towards their countries. Whether it's the September 11 attacks, or smaller scale but still traumatic bombings in Madrid, London, Amsterdam or other European cities, it is clear that a quite small yet significant number of Muslims is angry enough at the West broadly, or at the politics and/or cultures of the countries of residence specifically, to engage in violent acts against members of the host societies.
Yet, while it is clear that some Muslims don't like Americans, French or English citizens, it is by no means clear that we can generalize such sentiments either to the Muslim population at large, or that such sentiments are unique to Muslims. Indeed, an adjacent article to the WSJ critique of EU-language policy toward jihad dealt with “ugly Americans” and how universal is the hostility toward American foreign policy and globalization more broadly. More important, the seeming instinct to generalize is at the heart of the problem to begin with. What I would like to discuss today is the need to problematize such generalizations; after which I will try to delineate the varying causes of a much more diverse set of positions towards the US and Europe than is often assumed to exist, and finally to explore what are the reasons for the various positions held by Muslims on this issue; particularly the role of cultural and economic globalization, and the increasing role played by what I term sponsored or managed chaos in these processes.
The first problem, however, in addressing the issue of Muslim attitudes towards the “West” (which is the term I'll use to refer to the US and Europe collectively) is that it immediately falls into the trap of creating the very dichotomies that are used to justify the argument that there are such things as an easily identifiable “West” or “Islam,” which in turn are essentially separate and autonomously existing civilizations whose natural state is to be in conflict. It is to assume that there are a relatively homogeneous “us” and “them” when in fact it is quite clear that, in the case of the US, there are at least two “uses,” who have very little in common and increasingly dislike the other side. As for the Muslim majority world, with upwards of one and a half billion people living in dozens of countries, many of whom have at various times fought against their neighbors, who comprise hundreds of ethnic, sectarian and linguistic groups the idea of making an easy generalization of attitudes on any subject is problematic in the least. The sectarian (Sunni-Shii) fighting in Iraq, the near-genocide in Darfur, and other internecine Muslim violence—whether politically, religiously, economically or culturally motivated—reveals the impossibility of accurately working off such an incredibly broad generalization as “Islam” or “Muslims.” This is equally true of the largely non-violent yet more important theological and other disagreements among conservative, moderate (“wasatiya”) and progressive Muslim thinkers.
At the very least, if we want to attempt to define how “Muslims think,” there are several broad categories that define our investigations: the first separates Muslims into those living in the Muslim majority world and those living in non-Muslim societies. For the former, each country has a very unique history which would inform local attitudes towards the West, not just the difference between Arab, Turkish, Iranian, African, South-Asian and other experiences, but within the each of these broad regions, and vis-a-vis differences in class, gender and levels of human and political (democratic) development. All are crucial elements in determining the chances that any particular Muslim will feel a certain way about the West.
For those living in the West, a similar complex matrix is necessary to begin to chart Muslim attitudes: first off, the host country itself, as political and cultural policies very widely between, for example, the UK and France, whether an individual is a member of a long-standing community and was born in the country, whether s/he has full citizenship and/or social rights and protections, discrimination levels, whether the person is a recent arrival with no stake in the society, and what role any particular Western power is playing in the homeland society, either historically or presently. What this means is that, for example, while the London 7/7 bombers and those of Madrid in March 2003, clearly shared a hatred of their host societies, how they arrived at their murderous rage represents two very different experiences, as the former were native born citizens of the UK while the Madrid bombers where all transient migrants.
At this level the economic and cultural dynamics become quite important, as most of the Muslim majority world, and large parts of the Muslim population of many European countries, have been largely and in some ways structurally marginalized from the official flows of globalization, which has led to creation of alternative economic, cultural and identity networks, some of which veer or enter into what are formally considered “illegal.” And finally, globalization writ large has had a complex and often contradictory impact on this issue, changing economic relations between countries and class relations within them. Perhaps a young Iranian writing in a youth-oriented chat room explained the situation best in the following way: “The problem in Iran we have right now is that any[thing] Western is cherished. I told my cousins I would give money to my grand ma to buy them stuff from [the] bazaar. They were like no we want made in America. I was like idiots what you buy in American and Iran is all made in china what f-kking difference does it make.”
This statement is quite ironic, given the longstanding official hostility of the Iranian government to the West and especially the US, which go back centuries to the roots of what I have called the modernity matrix, a system in which colonialism, capitalism and nationalism have all played a vital role. It would seem to suggest, in perhaps a somewhat facile manner, that the less the US is believed to be responsible for or at least supporting an oppressive dynamic within a country and/or forcibly penetrating local cultures with its own, the more favorably it will be viewed. Such a view is consistent with detailed polling over the last three decades, which shows that citizens of major US allies such as Jordan or Egypt score much higher than supposed enemies like Iran in their negative feelings towards a supposedly primary ally of their governments, the United States. The specific issue that interests me, however, is not the usual question of attitudes towards US foreign policy, as it is almost universally criticized by Muslims in much the same way as its criticized by Europeans, and indeed liberal/progressive Americans.
Rather, the more interesting issue is one directly related to the often negative power of globalization, particularly its cultural component, to create feelings of a “cultural invasion” of Muslim countries, who have neither the wealth to participate nor the power to resist the often distorted, hyper commodified, consumerist and sexualized images of life in the West that appear on their TV screens. Thus, for example, as many as 85 percent of Jordanians share this sentiment, while supposedly fundamentalist Iran has among the lower numbers of people who fear western cultural invasion, at 55 percent: “In Iran, where the society has been dominated by a religious fundamentalist regime, the public appears to be less religious, less anti-West, more secular, and more pro-modernist values than the public in either Egypt or Jordan, where the state is secular and decidedly pro-West.”<![if !supportFootnotes]>[i]<![endif]> This doesn’t mean that they wholeheartedly support neoliberal globalization; but it clearly suggests that they are not against globalization per se, and like their Turkish counterparts see market liberalization as a way to obtain increasing freedom from an oppressive state.
Most interesting for me in the process of reading through literally hundreds of books and articles is how the great Muslim critics of the West of the last two centuries have mirrored and in many cases anticipated the great critiques of Western modernity offered by the likes of Marx and Thoreau, Walden Bellow and Amartya Sen. Yet as the quote at the beginning of the chapter shows, it’s not as simple as oppressed cultures piercing through the veil of modernity and showing the West the truth about its history—although it’s partly this. For the modernity matrix, like any asymmetrical system of power relations, also produced its own pathologies and disfunctionalities within Muslim majority societies, with al-Qa’eda, religiously inspired Muslim terrorism, and anti-Jewish conspiracy fantasies being the most obvious symptom.
The discussion thus far leads to the crucial question: What leads some young Muslims to gravitate to the most atavistic and extreme forms of their culture, others respond to oppressive and stifling official cultures by falling in love with everything produced by the Great Satan, and a precious few see the futility of both responses? This is a crucial set of questions; in the wake of September 11 and the war on terror we need to gain a better understanding of why and how critiques of the West, however severe, cross the line to outright hatred—how the pendulum swings between what we could term a “worldly Islam” that is fully engaged with other cultures and processes from a positive perspective (what the sociologist Manuel Castells terms a “project identity” because it can support the creation of open identities that can build broad yet strong communities), and a “ghetto Islam” that is closed and lacks the ability to do more than resist encroachments and threats from the “outside” (what Castells calls “resistance identities”). With this information we can initiate the much needed discussion of what all of us, Muslims and their neighbors, can do to build the intercommunal solidarities and cross-cultural bridges to make the drive toward violent resistance less attractive or viable an option.
Moreover, while most Arab/Muslim scholars, activists and other figures tend to be largely hostile to US policy and neoliberal globalization more broadly, we can't just accept the views of a self-selected elite towards this question: Just because Arab/Muslim writers say there’s a dangerous invasion going on doesn't mean in fact there is one. In fact, however interesting the focus on American culture, there is an equally important circulation of Latin American, Asian and especially Indian cultures in the Middle East that has to be considered if we want to understand what globalization truly means in the region.
Finally, people can enjoy Britney Spears, Finding Nemo or “The Simpsons;” but this does not mean a (young) personsss buys into the US or European policies that clearly go against his or her country’s or culture’s interests. This is precisely the fallacy of the promoters of US sponsored Arab radio or television networks such as Radio Sawa’ (the American-created Arabic language music and news radio network), who believe they’re opening the minds of young Arabs by pumping in American pop music laced with supposedly unbiased news programming. It is quite simplistic to imagine that because young Egyptians or Lebanese listen to an American radio station they’ll support, or at least forget about, US policies towards Iraq, Israel, or the majority of the two dozen odd other oppressive regimes in the region. Yet American politicians and their corporate media allies seem to imagine that if only we can get them to like our culture, they’ll like our politics. It might surprise them, but most Arab young people don’t experience any cognitive dissonance simultaneously liking Justin Timberlake and disliking George Bush.
But it’s even more complex than this, as there can also be multiple levels of cultural interaction, which can mask each other in potentially dangerous ways. As one Saudi doctor explains, “My daughter is for bin Laden. When I go to wake her up, I see pictures of Palestinian girl martyrs on her wall. It scares me to death. If we go into her room at night, she’ll be listening to Britney Spears, but as soon as we close the door she’s listening to martyr songs.”<![if !supportFootnotes]>[ii]<![endif]> This kind of cultural schizophrenia is also globalization, and not a very comfortable one at that—in fact it’s awfully depressing (an astonishing number of Saudis are, it seems, clinically depressed).
But we can’t limit our analysis of culture to the most violently negative responses to globalization by the likes of bin Laden. For every Saudi or Egyptian who sympathizes with al-Qa’eda there are dozens or even hundreds searching for ways to adapt to and work with the dominant cultural and economic trends, however difficult this may be. And since Muslim societies are so increasingly young, by examining the culture of young people, and particularly (but not only) the music they listen to and in some cases perform, we can find precisely the bridges between cultures where the possibility of positive transformation of both Muslim and Western culture is possible.
This will be hard, however, for a constant theme in contemporary Arab discourses on globalization is the “clash of civilizations” discourse of Samuel Huntington, and the globalizing American foreign policy system it is believed to represent. The choice offered by America is understood to be stark: either a “civilization” (or culture or country) joins the New World Order (and in doing so, repudiates the essence of that civilization) or face conflict with and likely exile from it.<![if !supportFootnotes]>[iii]<![endif]>
Such a system is contrasted with what many critics would hope to be a “true democracy,” whose most basic components would be justice, tolerance, and “the right to be different.”<![if !supportFootnotes]>[iv]<![endif]> This focus on the right to cultural difference is crucial, because globalization is understood to create not a “multicultural” difference that is celebrated and encourages mutual respect and cooperation, but rather a forced difference that deepens poverty and inequality both within and between countries.
This emphasis on democracy should not surprise us. As sociologists Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris discovered in their extensive review of polling data on attitudes towards democracy in the Muslim world,
Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the West and Islamic worlds concerns democracy. The evidence suggests striking similarities in the political values held in these societies… the Huntington thesis fails to identify the most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam, which concerns the issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. Compared with Western societies, support for democracy was marginally slightly stronger (not weaker) among those living in Islamic societies.<![if !supportFootnotes]>[v]<![endif]>
At the same time, it would seem that the consensus of Arab scholars is not that different from their critical European and American counterparts: globalization is neither a new phenomenon nor just another stage in the development of capitalism. Rather it marks a continuation of the basic dynamic of the relationship between the West and Orient dating back hundreds of years, the hallmark of which is a Western desire for global hegemony which in earlier eras was represented by imperialism and colonialism. The most prominent feature of the new system—which is essentially a more powerful version of the old system—is the attempt by the United States, the main instigator of globalization, to overthrow existing political, economic, and cultural norms in favor of cementing a “New World Order” that will perpetuate its power at the expense of developing societies. What is interesting here, however, is that during the last few years, while the suspicion of the US and the Washington Consensus model of globalization has not changed very much (and perhaps has even increased), such is the corruption and oppression of most Middle Eastern/Muslim states that many activists are coming to see neoliberal globalization as offering at least the potential to weaken authoritarian regimes and in so doing offer some measure of hope to their populations. .<![if !supportFootnotes]>[vi]<![endif]>
At the same time, especially among more progressive or at least moderate religious figures, there is a clear shift away from the older Muslim Brotherhood belief, epitomized by Sayyid Qutb, that only a formally and rigidly Islamist system of governance of all aspect of society would enable“complete social justice” to society. Rather, in an increasing “dialog of civilizations” Muslim scholars and activists are joining with other opponents of what Qutb termed “exploitative capitalism” to imagine alternative systems of global and local economic and even political governance, such as the vision put forward by the World and European Social Forum movements.
One recent Moroccan study explained that during the last decade Arab scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of culture at precisely the moment that globalization has brought on the culturalization of politics. Because of this, contemporary Arab/Muslim writings have moved beyond using culture in lieu of (prohibited) discussions of politics, and have allowed more honest discussions related to the future development of the region to emerge: “Something radically different is happening when [culture] signifies the perception of new dimensions of social conflict, of the formation of new identities and new forms of resistance. [Today] the field of culture refers us not only to the past, but to the present in all its conflict and creativity.”<![if !supportFootnotes]>[vii]<![endif]>
Writings such as these show that Arabs and Muslims have not just come to the idea of self-criticism lately, but instead have long looked at themselves and the world around them with a critical eye. But their self-critiques have always been inseparable from their critiques of the West, which is precisely what makes them so unappealing to Western commentators.
Indeed, at the same time that religious figures young and old call for Muslims to see that the West can be “Dar al-Islam” (that is, a land of peace), that democracy and (something quite approaching) “western” notions of gender equality are Islamically sanctioned (and even required), or that Muslims should fully engage and dialog with other cultures, they remain quite critical of the policies of Western governments and the ideologies behind them. We can actually see the wassettiyya Islamists as being as critical of and opposed to modernity as their more extreme colleagues.
For example, the Moroccan Sheikh Yassine rails against “armed capitalist modernity,” using a phrase that echoes the description by the philosopher George Sorel of the inherent similarity between “the capitalist type and the warrior type.” His view arose from the recognition that modernity has never lived up to its billing as the herald of freedom, justice and democracy. More broadly, Yassine urges all people to “address modernity with questions it has no interest in, and which its citizens haven’t the time to ask... [because] two way communication is beyond reach with a modernity that is comfortably installed in a way of life hardly troubled” by the misery it produces.<![if !supportFootnotes]>[viii]<![endif]>
What we learn from the writings of so-called moderate figures like Sheikh Yassine is the desire for “concluding a pact of mutual aid among humankind that crosses the boundaries of state structures and goes above the heads of official institutions. [For Islam] this is our ideal of beneficence strictly bound to our ideal of spiritual perfection. This plan for a worldwide humanitarian coalition responds to the utopian dream and the actuality of the flagrant imbalance that rages between north and south.”
The younger generation of religious intellectuals and activists can be even harsher with their criticism of both the West and Islam. And so Sheikh Yassine’s daughter, Nadia, who is one of the most powerful Muslim women political figures in the world, argues that in many ways Islam was hijacked by men—that is, literally, men, not men and women—after the era of the first four rulers (the “Rightly Guided Caliphs”) who distorted its message of tolerance and equality (including between the sexes) in favor of a vision based on power and patriarchy.<![if !supportFootnotes]>[ix]<![endif]>
What is most important, given our discussion of the importance of power above, she continues by arguing that “Lord Acton said: ‘Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’ So where to seek vaccination against those deadly viruses of lust of power, intolerance, violence etc…? Here spirituality and morality come to center stage. So long as all the social groups within a society do not partake in the formulation of a consensus-and-conciliation oriented communal project, room will be left to extremists who will fish the troubled waters to thwart any attempts to interpret Islam in a different manner.”
This is a crucial vision, one shared by leading European Muslim intellectual and activist Tariq Ramadan, who argues that “During the Prophet’s life he came with a liberating process but after he died the message was hijacked by people, jurists and scholars more interested in the power and the discrimination against women. What this means is that we had a religion originally coming with universal values, which allows/allowed us to take everything that wasn’t against our principles as Muslims.”
The Fetullah Gülen movement, which rapidly spread to become one of the most important Sufi movements in the world (certainly in Turkey), epitomizes another approach to these dynamics, one that has long focused its message on self-help, civic participation, education and industry. It resembles 1950s bootstrap Republicanism in the US—particularly, in the subordinate role offered to women in his movement—as much as it does liberal Islam.
Working through the main Turkish association of religiously oriented small and medium sized businesses (TUSIAD), the Gülen movement demonstrates that for many religiously oriented Turks succeeding in business becomes an important ideological, indeed, religious, goal (much like the “Protestant Ethic”), to which other political or social goals become subservient. This dynamic has had a profound impact on the political scene in Turkey, and in 2003 helped elect as Prime Minister an Islamist-leaning former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Erdogan,<![if !supportFootnotes]>[x]<![endif]> whose Justice and Development Party is made up largely of younger and pragmatic “modern Islamists” that “increasingly challenge the antimodern, dogmatic policies of the former [Islamist] prime minister.”<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xi]<![endif]>
And so today in Turkey we see an approach to globalization, fundamentally driven by the need and desire to integrate fully with Europe, which has led even Turkish Islamist politics to advocate a European-parliamentary style “Muslim democracy” loosely patterned on the Christian democratic parties of its neighbors to the West. Even when they criticize neoliberal globalization for a “lack of sensitivity needed to build and maintain peace” and “inequalities on the behalf of developed countries and feeds political instability,” they feel that Turkey, “with its historical heritage and with its identity blending Western and Eastern civilizations,” is uniquely qualified to act as a guide and facilitator of a new global civilization.<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xii]<![endif]>
European Muslim Dynamics
Such a view is also vital to understanding the growing conflicts in Europe as well, as we can discuss vis-a-vis the dynamics underlying the sometimes violent protests of poor and often—but by no means exclusively—Muslim youth last fall in France. In a situation of economic distress, we can evaluate the growth of the Islamic movements as a consequence of structural developments in recent years concerning the economy and the role of the state.
It is clear that once the employment situation became less stable, (im)migrant communities turned to new sources of moral and economic and cultural support that were reflected in a “value-shift” towards the type of religious expression that is best able to compensate for their more or less permanent economic and political marginalisation.<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> The situation described above is undoubtedly as relevant to the Middle East as to Europe.
We can conclude that Muslim, and specifically Islamist attitudes toward the West within Europe is nurtured by many of the same systematic processes which are found at the global level. And while these movements must be understood and defined in their local circumstances and in response to local conditions (just like women’s, peace, and environmental movements), the convergences in experiences and attitudes between European and Middle Eastern Muslims is incontrovertible.
Yet more positively, this situation also reveals the power of Islam as a transnational identity (especially in the link between culture and economy) which allows, for example, networks to be formed by small businesses and associations in Germany and Turkey that allow Turkish immigrants to benefit from being political and social actors in both countries. Indeed, globalization, it is naturally hoped by most Muslims, “should herald a new future for Islam-Europe relations.”<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]>
This dynamic further reveals the important role of class/economic position in determining religious expression of European Muslims, in fostering and supporting a Muslim elite capable of acquiring a transnational legitimacy in both Europe and their country of origin, and more broadly, in shaping the space of Europe and the Euro-Med region into a “terre de mediation” between Europe and the Muslim world.<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]>
Indeed, European Islam, it must be reiterated, is more than just a simple affair of race, class, economy and/or religion. Rather it involves the interpenetration of these diverse factors within an environment of simultaneous “multiculturalism” in Europe and a mutual recrimination by the two “sides.”<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> Ghettoisation and political radicalization are no longer inexorable givens for young Muslims, despite the violence in France and similar problems in other countries. Nevertheless, as in the Muslim majority world, the worldview of the Islamic movements in Europe is greatly influenced by the state’s rejection of their legitimacy, which produces a body of experience within these movements that is “negative throughout.” From a subordinate position, “we cannot expect an open mind to Western values.”<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]>
Such experiences will have a determinative impact on the extent to which Muslim immigrants and citizens will ultimately develop a “Euro” (i.e., integrated) or “ghetto” Islam in various European countries—and in their home countries as well—and whether this will evolve into concrete relationships with the myriad European progressive movements that so far largely ignore, if not actively exclude, European Muslims and other minorities.<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]>
Conclusion: Drawing the Boundaries of Us and Them in the post 9/11 Muslim World
Iran and Iraq are two very interesting cases to end our discussion. Ostensibly, the two countries couldn't be farther apart in their views of the US, or West more broadly. Iran is at present considered the single biggest strategic threat to the United States; and the words and actions of President Ahmedinejad lend reflect the official hostility towards the US dating back to the revolutionary anti-American rhetoric of Khomeini. Yet unlike many Arab critics, who tend to link anti-US rhetoric (at least in terms of its politics) with a similar negative attitude towards globalization, a majority of the Iranian ruling elite understands that the cultural effects of the emerging globalization are not predetermined. Even for more conservative religious figures cultural globalization has “some attractive things,” while the problems it causes are not unique to Iran or Islam.<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xiii]<![endif]> As one conservative Ayatollah explained, “The problem of cultural invasion is not just with Iran. China, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea and France have already allocated parts of their budgets to efforts to contain the invasion of American culture.”<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xiv]<![endif]>
At the same time, however, “the western cultural invasion reveals the will of certain powers to put their cultural dominance on the world.” Through satellites in particular, which are officially banned in Iran (although in practice they flourished), the West has succeeded in creating a “western cultural occupation” of people’s most private spaces—the home. Yet on the other hand, as we've seen above, a large share of Iranians are actually quite pro-American in opposition to the official policies of the regime.
This is also true with regard to relations with the United States.
However, here, as the Iraq conflict makes clear, the overriding US strategic
objectives to control the region militarily, strategically and at least
vis-a-vis the oil and (where possible) defense sectors economically, has helped
to produce in the wake of September
The view of these crucial petroleum producing regions as “unstable” is not just descriptive; in many ways it is also prescriptive as well. By this I mean that since the late 1980s and into the 1990s a consensus has emerged among US military and business elites that the post-Cold War globalized order would produce an Age of Anarchy which the US was obligated to manage, and more, to profit from and even “thrive” on (as a best-selling 1988 book by business guru Tom Peters advised.
In the geostrategic context, we can see the impact of this philosophy in what I have called the “sponsored” or “managed” chaos in Iraq. Such chaos, as I have argued in detail elsewhere, serves many long term strategic goals in Iraq by ensuring a long term presence of US troops in the country and control over access to the country's immense oil wealth by rival powers such as China. The reasons behind US Iraq policy (which in many ways mirrors Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories), is not our concern here. Rather, it is the consequences in terms of Muslim attitudes towards the United States, to a lesser extent the UK, and by association Europe. If Americans have been urged for the last generation to “face up to the need for revolution” and find “prescriptions for a world turned upside down,”<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xv]<![endif]> the resultant economic and military policies as epitomized by the Bush Administration have clearly reinforced the tendencies towards the “resistance identities” I described above. The sad truth, however, is that the increased feelings of bitterness and anger such policies cause in the Muslim world only help perpetuate the clash of civilizations vision of US elites, and the incredible profits it helps generate to the oil, arms and related industries that benefit from a militarized globalization. A crucial question in the coming years will be how critical yet non-violent, even progressive Muslim forces respond to this challenge, and what role their counterparts in the West will play this development.
<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> Cf. Pedersen, Newer Islamic Movements, p. 158; Nonneman, “Muslim Communities in the New Europe,” pp. 15-18.
<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> Mohamad Abu Bakar, “Islam, Malaysia and Europe: Perceiving the Past, Perfecting the Future,” in Ismail Hj. Ibrahim, and Abu Bakar Abdul Majeed, eds., The Islamic World and Europe: Some Issues, Kuala Lumpur, Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, 1998, pp. 41-61, p. 58.
<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> Cf. Nadia Hashmi, “Immigrant Children in Europe: Constructing a Transnational Identity, in Höfert and Salvatore, pp. 163-174.
<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> Cf. Werner Menski, “Nationalité, citoyenneté et musulmans en Grande-Bretagne,” in Bistolfi and Zabbat, Islams D’Europe…, pp. 133-140, pp. 133-4.
<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> Cf. L. Brouwer, “Binding Religion: Moroccan and Turkish Runaway Girls,” in Shadid and Koningsveld, eds., Islam in Dutch Society…, pp. 75-89, p. 77.
<![if !supportFootnotes]><![endif]> Bisolfi and Zabbal, p. 28.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[i]<![endif]> Mansoor Moaddel and Taqhi Azadarmaki, “The Worldviews of Islamic Publics: the Cases of Egypt, Iran and Jordan,” in Inglehard, ed., Human Values and Social Change…, pp. 69-89.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[ii]<![endif]> Quoted in Lawrence Wright, “The Kingdom of Silence,” The New Yorker, January 5, 2004, p. 63.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[iii]<![endif]> George al-Rasi, interview in al-Nahar, 13 December, 1999, p. 14.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[iv]<![endif]> Al-jabari, Qadaya fi al-fikr al-mu'asir, pp. 30, 73.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[v]<![endif]> Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis,” in Ronald Inglehart, ed., Human Values and Social Change: Findings from the Values Surveys, Leiden: Brill, 2003, pp. 5-34, pp. 7, 21, emphasis in the original.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[vi]<![endif]> Asamah Abdul-Rahman, ed., Tanmiyyah al-Takhalaf wa-idarah al-Tanmiyyah: Idara al-Tanmiyyah fi al-watan al-'Arabi wa al-Nitham al-'Alami al-Jadid (Development of Backwardness and the Management of Development: Managing Development in the Arab Nation and the New World Order), Beirut: Merkaz al-Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, pp. 115, 150.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[vii]<![endif]> This powerful quote comes from Habib Benrahhal Serghini, “Culture and Development,” in Taieb Belghazi and Lahcen Haddad, eds., Global/Local Cultures and Sustainable Development, Rabat, Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Mohammed V University, Conferences and Colloquia Series No. 91, 2001, pp. 203-206, p. 204.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[viii]<![endif]> For English versions of Yassine’s books, see Abdessalem Yassine, Winning the Modern World for Isalm, Justice and Spirituality Publications, 2000, and The Muslim Mind on Trial: Divine Revelation Versus Secular Rationalism, Justice and Spirituality Publishing, 2003.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[ix]<![endif]> As she argued in a forum of leading younger Islamist intellectuals I organized in Budapest, May 25, 2003, transcript available at www.humanities.uci.edu/history/levineconference.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[x]<![endif]> In the 1990s Erdogan was jailed by the military for his supposedly extremist views. For a good early analysis of this phenomenon, see Ziya Onis, “The Political Economy of the Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1997), pp. 743-73. Also see, Yavuz, “The Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey…”
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xi]<![endif]> Ian Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xii]<![endif]> Deputy prime minister and the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahceli, as quoted in the Turkish Daily News, April 3, 2002.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xiii]<![endif]> Cf. Azadeh Kian, “L’invasion culturelle occidentale: mythe ou realité,” Cahiers d’études sur al Méditerranée orientale e le monde turco-iranien, No. 20, juillet-décembre, 1995, pp. 72-90.
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xiv]<![endif]> For an important mid-1990s assessment of this trend, see Kian, “L’invasion culturelle occidentale…”
<![if !supportFootnotes]>[xv]<![endif]> Peters, Thriving on Chaos, p. 38.